

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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USIA-15 IO-14 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

DRC-01 /164 W

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R 111849Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 954

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SAHPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 10211

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MBFR PLENARY MEETING DEC. 11 STATE-  
MENT OF CZECHOSLOVAK REP

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS PLENARY STATEMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAK REP  
(KLEIN) 11 DECEMBER 1973. TEXT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN QUOTE: DISTINGUISHED CHAIRMAN,

1. THE DELEGATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC HAS  
ALREADY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ITS OPINION ON THE MAIN  
TOPICS OF OUR CONFERENCE, WHOSE AIM SHOULD BE THE ATTAINMENT OF  
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A JUST AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY.

2. OUR APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM IS NATURALLY EXPRESSED IN ITS MOST CONCENTRATED AND CLEAR FORM IN THE JOINT DRAFT AGREEMENT PROPOSED ON 8 NOVEMBER THIS YEAR BY FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE FURTHER FUNDAMENTAL AND DEEP EXPOSITION OF ITS INDIVIDUAL PARTS CONTAINED IN THE SPEECHES OF THE CO-SPONSORS OF THIS DOCUMENT AND OF THE OTHER DELEGATIONS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAS PROMOTED BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION.

IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT HAS BEEN CONVINCINGLY SHOWN BY THE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES CITED HERE THAT OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT CONFORMS TO THE UNDERSTANDING CONTAINED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

3. THE DISCUSSION NOW IN PROGRESS SHOWS THAT IT IS THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF 38 JUNE 1973 THAT HAS BECOME THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE WHICH MUST ENSURE IF, OF COURSE, IT IS OBSERVED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT WE DO NOT TURN ASIDE FROM THE RIGHT TRACK AND FALL VICTIM TO FRUITLESS DISCUSSIONS ON QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH THE PROBLEM UNDER DISCUSSION.

4. IN FOLLOWING CAREFULLY THE PROGRESS OF THE DISCUSSION AND IN ANALYZING BOTH INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS AND THE PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY THE US DELEGATION ON 22 NOVEMBER, WE CANNOT RID OURSELVES OF THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS ARE IN A DEFINITE SENSE DEVIATING FROM THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973.

5. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE COME TO VIENNA WITH THE INTENTION OF ATTAINING THE CONCRETE REALIZATION OF THOSE INTENTIONS ON WHICH WE AGREED DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THEY HAVE THEREFORE PROPOSED A COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH CORRESPONDS FULLY WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS IN MIND AT THE SAME TIME OUR COMMON AIR TO PROMOTE THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

6. IN THE SPEECHES AND PROPOSALS OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS, HOWEVER, CONFIDENTIAL

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WE DISCOVER THAT THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS ACTUALLY TO BE THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF SO-CALLED DISPARITIES IN THE GROUND FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, AND IN A FIRST PHASE IN THE GROUND FORCES OF ONLY TWO PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THE FINAL GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE, IN THE VIEW OF THESE DELEGATIONS, THE ATTAINMENT OF SOME COMMON CEILING IN THE MANPOWER OF THE GROUND FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, WHICH WOULD IN FACT LEAD TO A CHANGE IN THE EXISTING SITUATION IN FAVOR

OF THE NATO COUNTRIES.

7. IN THE CASE INPOINT IT IS HARD TO ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS IS A QUESTION ONLY OF A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH WHICH, IT IS CLAIMED, IS INTENDED TO FACILITATE A SOLUTION TO OUR COMMON TASK, IN OUR VIEW, THE VERY HEART OF THE PROBLEM IS AT STAKE HERE - I.E., THE ALREADY AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNIQUE THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE AGGREGATE, AND NOT JUST OF GROUND FORCES.

8. IF WE LET THIS MAIN QUESTION DROP OUT OF SIGHT, WE WOULD BE UNDERMINING THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNDERSTANDING CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS, INCLUDING THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

9. THE CONCEPTS OF DISPARITY, IMBALANCE OR INSTABILITY APPEAR IN THE STATEMENTS AND ARGUMENTATION OF OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES IN ALL CASES WHEN THEY LOSE SIGHT OF THE EXISTING REAL BALANCE IN THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN EUROPE, WHICH DERIVES FROM THE SINGLE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN ARMED FORCES OF BOTH SIDES AS WELL AS FROM THE CLOSE INTERACTION AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF ALL ARMS OF SERVICE. WE ARE SPEAKING HERE OF THAT EQUILIBRIUM WHICH HAS MADE POSSIBLE IN RECENT YEARS THE SOLUTION OF MANY COMPLEX POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF OUR CONTINENT AND OF WHICH, MOREOVER, THE CURRENT CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE AND, FINALLY, THE VERY FACT OF THE BEGINNING OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE MANIFESTATIONS.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 955  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

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10. IN OUR DISCUSSION THERE ALSO OCCUR ASSERTIONS THAT THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION SOLELY ON THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES, ABOVE ALL, THOSE OF TWO COUNTRIES -- THE U.S. AND THE USSR -- WOULD SIMPLIFY THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. AND WHAT IS MORE, IN THE OPINION OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, ANY ATTEMPT TO INCLUDE IN THIS PROCESS FROM THE OUTSET THE ARMED FORCES OF OTHER PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES AND ALL THE TYPES OF THEIR ARMAMENTS WOULD BE AN IMPOSSIBLY COMPLEX TASK COMPLICATING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENT.

11. WE ASSUME THAT ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS HAVE BEEN AWARE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING THAT THIS PROBLEM IS NOT AT ALL EASY. THIS AWARENESS WAS REFLECTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE OF THIS YEAR, IN WHICH WE ALL AFFIRMED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY INNER QUOTE "TO ASSURE A MORE EFFECTIVE AND CAREFUL APPROACH TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

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COMPLEX CHARACTER." INNER UNQUOTE

12. IN THAT CONNECTION WE AGREE WITH THE OPINION OF THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NETHERLANDS, THAT THE FAIRNESS OF THE RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS IS THE CRITERION WHICH MUST GUIDE THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN OUR OPINION A FAIR RESULT CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY WHEN WE EXAMINE THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AGGREGATE, AS IS ENVISAGED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. IN SUCH AN IMPORTANT QUESTION, WHICH CONCERNS FIRST OF ALL THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANT STATES, A DECISION WHICH ON THE SURFACE APPEARS EASY MUST NOT NECESSARILY AT THE SAME TIME BE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF FINAL RESULTS - A JUST AND (MISSING).

13. THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IS IN ITSELF A SUFFICIENTLY COMPLEX MATTER AND REQUIRES AOF ALL PARTICIPANTS CONSIDERABLE EFFORT, POLITICAL DETERMINATION AND GOOD WILL. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THAT THAT WE ARE DISTURBED BY THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CONTINUE

TO INTRODUCE INTO OUR NEGOTIATIONS QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMMUNIQUE. WE HAVE IN MIND FIRST OF ALL THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS CONCERNING STABILIZING MEASURES, WHICH IN THE CONCEPTION OF THEIR AUTHORS MUST EVEN BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SUCH AN APPROACH CAN ONLY COMPLICATE OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE SOLUTION OF THE MAIN TASK, WHICH IS THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

14. ALTHOUGH THE PROPOSALS ON THE SO-CALLED STABILIZING MEASURES HAVE IN MANY RESPECTS NOT YET BEEN FULLY REVEALED, IT IS NEVERTHELESS POSSIBLE TO FORM A DEFINITE OPINION OF THEIR CONTENT AND DIRECTION FROM INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS AND ALSO FROM THE PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS OF 22 NOVEMBER 1973.

15. ONE GROUP OF PROPOSED MEASURES FOCUSSES ON QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE CUSTOMARY ACTIVITY OF TROOPS, SUCH AS TRAINING, THE TRANSFER OF TROOPS, ETC. WITH REGARD TO THESE PROPOSALS IT CAN BE SAID HERE THAT INNER QUOTE "AS A WHOLE, SUCH  
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MEASURES SERVE TO DEFINE CLEARLY THE LEVELS OF ACTIVITY OF TROOPS WHICH INSPIRE CONCERN ON BOTH SIDES." INNER UNQUOTE IT REMAINS AN IMMUTABLE FACT, ESTABLISHED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973, THAT THE TASK OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, AND NOT THE EXAMINATION OF THE ACTIVITY OF TROOPS IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE DELIMITED BY US. FURTHERMORE, THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN STATES PROPOSED TO INSCRIBE THIS QUESTION ON THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN HELSINKI IS MORE THAN ENOUGH PROOF THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE NOT CONNECTED WITH THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THEY ARE A SEPARATE QUESTION, INDEPENDENT FROM THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

16. THIS ASSESSMENT REFERS ALSO TO THE QUESTION OF THE PREVENTION OF SURPRISE ATTACK. OBVIOUSLY WE ALL REMEMBER THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1958, THE TASK OF WHICH WAS TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. THE CONFERENCE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL FOR WELL-KNOWN REASONS, AND THIS SEPARATE AND COMPLEX QUESTION, WHICH EVEN THEN WAS IN NO WAY CONNECTED WITH THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, REMAINS OPEN AND UNDECIDED TO THIS DAY. THE ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE FOR CONSIDERATION IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND ATTEMPTS TO MAKE IT AN INTEGRAL PART OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS NOT ONLY WOULD NOT HELP TO SOLVE THIS SEPARATE PROBLEM, BUT WOULD BE A SERIOUS OBSTACLE IN THE PATH OF SUCCESSFUL FULFILLMENT OF OUR TASK.

17. PERMIT ME, MR. CHAIRMAN, IN THIS CONNECTION TO MAKE ONE MORE COMMENT. ON THE ONE HAND, IT IS PROPOSED THAT WE CONCERN OURSELVES ONLY WITH THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES, AND ON THE OTHER HAND, WITH THE PROBLEMATICS OF SURPRISE ATTACK, DIMINUTION OF THE RISK OF ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION ETC., WHICH AT THE GIVEN STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ARMIES OBJECTIVELY REFERS TO ALL ARMS OF SERVICE. I ASK YOU, WHAT IS THE LOGIC OF SUCH AN APPROACH?

18. MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS NATURAL THAT STATES WHICH CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHICH AFFECT THEIR SECURITY, ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FACT THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS CARRY OUT CONFIDENTIAL

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THEIR OBLIGATIONS. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AS WELL AS OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, APPROACHES THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CONVICTION THAT THIS REFLECTS THE DESIRE OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.

19. IN THIS CONNECTION ONE CAN FULLY AGREE WITH THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM WHO STATED: INNER QUOTE "IT IS CLEAR THAT GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT IN THE HABIT OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS WITH EACH OTHER THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO OBSERVE. ONE MAY AND EVEN MUST ASSUME THAT AGREEMENTS SIGNED ARE INTENDED TO BE OBSERVED, THAT IS, FULFILLED IN PRACTICE. IF THE PARTIES WHO HAVE SIGNED IT DID NOT HAVE AN A PRIORI# CONVICTION, THEN IT WOULDN'T MAKE ANY SENSE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS". INNER UNQUOTE

20 CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SHOW MANY EXAMPLES THAT EVEN AGREEMENTS DEALING WITH THE MOST COMPLEX ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENTS OR THE LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE ARE BEING RESPECTED AND OBSERVED. NO STATE HAVING PUT ITS SIGNATURE TO AN AGREEMENT OR TREATY AND THUS HAVING ASSUMED CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS CAN AFFORD THESE DAYS TO VIOLATE IT WITHOUT RISKING DISCLOSURE AND CONDEMNATION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

NOTE BY OC/T: # AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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R 111849Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 956

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

21. ON THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE, RESTING ON MUTUAL TRUST, WE ALSO BASE OUR APPROACH TO THE OBLIGATIONS TO OBSERVE THE FUTURE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ARTICLE 7 OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL PROVISION FOR SOLVING POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH COULD ARISE IN THE COURSE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ARTICLE, INNER QUOTE " EACH STATE PARTICIPANT, IF IT HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OTHER STATE-PARTICIPANT IS NOT OBSERVING THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, MAY CONDUCT BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE INTERESTED PARTIES, AND THEN, IN CASE OF NEED, TO DEMAND A CONSULTATION OF ALL STATES-PARTICIPANTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDING CONFIDENTIAL

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THE FULFILMENT OF THE AGREEMENT." INNER UNQUOTE.

22. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT GUARANTEES FOR THE FULFILMENT OF THE AGREEMENT FORMULATED IN THIS MANNER ARE FULLY SATISFACTORY AND REFLECT THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR THE

OBLIGATIONS THEY HAVE ASSUMED. THE METHOD OF VERIFICATION PROPOSED BY WESTERN DELEGATIONS FOR ENSURING THE OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREEMENT BY MEANS OF INSPECTIONS CARRIED OUT BY OBSERVERS ON THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES ALREADY CONTAINS IN ITSELF AN ELEMENT OF DISTRUST. THIS IN THE FINAL RESULT COULD ONLY LEAD TO MANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND COMPLICATIONS WHICH IN NO WAY WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN THE SENSE OF SECURITY AND TRUST IN THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT.

23. IF THE PROPOSALS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES RAISE IN A VAGUE FORM THE QUESTION OF CIRCUMVENTION OR VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAS THE PROPER ANSWER TO IT. IN ARTICLE 6 INNER QUOTE STATES- PARTICIPANTS UNDERTAKE NOT TO PERMIT ANY INCREASE OF PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT TECHNOLOGY OF FOREIGN AS WELL AS NATIONAL TROOPS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA. CURRENT ROTATION OF PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT TECHNOLOGY WILL BE CARRIED OUT WITH STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE REDUCED LEVELS." INNER UNQUOTE. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE OBLIGATION IS OF A CONCRETE NATURE AND COVERS ALL QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE STRICT FULFILLMENT OF THE AGREEMENT.

24. IF ONE TALKS ABOUT MEASURES RELATED TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, I.E., SUCH MEASURES WHICH SHOULD FURTHER THE REALIZATION OF THIS MAIN TASK, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT FAILED TO NOTICE AN IMPORTANT PART OF ARTICLE 7 OF OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE CRITERIA OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE 28 TH OF JUNE, 1973. I HAVE IN MIND THE PROVISION WHICH STATES THAT THE STATES-PARTICIPANTS WILL OFFICIALLY NOTIFY EACH OTHER OF THE BEGINNING AND THE CONCLUSION OF PRACTICAL MEASURES ON THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. PROPOSALS OF THIS VERY NATURE DO FURTHER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT AND STRENGTHEN MUTUAL TRUST.

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25. THE QUESTION OF CREATING AND STRENGTHENING MUTUAL TRUST IS UNDOUBTEDLY AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE BASIS OF THIS TRUST IS TO BE FOUND IN THE AREA OF A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. IF WE CAN SUCCEED IN COMPLEMENTING THE POLITICAL DETENTE WITH A MILITARY DETENTE THEN QUITE OBVIOUSLY A MORE FAVORABLE SITUATION WILL BE CREATED FOR THE SOLUTION OF OTHER QUESTIONS, WHICH WOULD HELP TO CONSOLIDATE THE STABLE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND ALSO TO STRENGTHEN TRUST IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES.

26. MR. CHARIMAN, IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973 WE OURSELVES HAVE DEFINED THE SUBJECT AND THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR



NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY KIND OF CONFERENCE. THEREFORE, THE ATTEMPTS TO BRING UP FOR DISCUSSION PROBLEMS WHICH ARE BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMUNIQUE, MANY OF WHICH COULD EVEN BECOME THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE CONFERENCE, WOULD ONLY CONSIDERABLY COMPLICATE THE SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

27. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIA SOCIALIST REPUBLIC IS CONVINCED THAT IF ALL WILL FOLLOW THE UNDERSTANDING CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE ABOUT THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, WE WILL BE ABLE TO FIND A JUST AND A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY DELEGATIONS OF THE GDR, THE PPR, USSR AND CSR SHOWS THE WAY LEADING TOWARDS SUCH A SOLUTION. END QUOTE. MOWINCKEL.

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